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COMMENTS
HAS THE BURGER COURT DEALT A DEATH BLOW TO THE
PRESUMPTION OF MALICE IN VIRGINIA?
While presumptions and burdens of proof have generally eluded effective
analysis,' the presumption of malice has almost defied it. Notwithstanding
a common law origin and the significance that instructions of the
presumption of malice have played in many murder trials in Virginia, the
presumption has constantly been under attack. 2 This comment will explore the meaning of the presumption of malice and determine whether
Virginia's approach violates the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment in light of the recent Supreme Court decision of Mullaney v.
3

Wilbur.

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

Malice as a judicial concept was initially introduced by the English
common law courts in the 13th century as a proper term to distinguish a
felonious homicide from a lawful one. 4 When the courts began classifying
1. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 802-03 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972)
MCCORMICK], wherein the authors stated: "One ventures the assertion

[hereinafter cited as
that 'presumption' is

the slipperiest member of the family of legal terms except its first cousin, 'burden of proof.'"
In recent years, there has been extensive commentary on the use of presumptions in criminal
prosecutions. See Abrams, Statutory CriminalPresumptions:A SuggestedAnalysis, 22 VAND.
L. REV. 1135 (1969); Ashford & Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions and Due Process in
Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165 (1969); Christie & Pye,
Presumptions and Assumptions in the Criminal Law: Another View, 1970 DUKE L.J. 919;
Holland & Chamberlin, Statutory Criminal Presumptions:Proof Beyond a Reasopable
Doubt;, 7 VAL. U.L. REV. 147 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Holland & Chamberlin]; Hug,
Presumptions and Inferences in Criminal Law, 56 MiL. L. REv. 81 (1972); Soules,
Presumptionsin Criminal Cases, 20 BAYLOR L. REv. 277 (1968) (Texas law); Note, The Constitutionalityof the Common Law Presumption of Malice in Maine, 54 B.U.L. REV. 973 (1974);
38 Mo. L. REV. 105 (1973); 2 ST. MARY's L.J. 115 (1970); 24 Sw. L.J. 557 (1970); Note, The
Unconstitutionalityof Statutory Criminal Presumptions,22 STAN. L. REV. 341 (1970); Note,
Abrogation of Criminal Statutory Presumptions,5 SUFFOLK L. REv. 161 (1970).
2. In Dingus v. Commonwealth, 153 Va. 846, 853, 149 S.E. 414, 416 (1929), cited with
approval in Barber v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 241, 253, 142 S.E.2d 484, 493 (1965), the
Virginia court, in addition to acknowledging the constant criticism of instructions incorporating the presumption of malice, noted that such instructions are "nearly always given upon
motion of the prosecutor in every homicide case."
3. 421 U.S. 684 (1975). Justice Rehnquist filed a concurring opinion, in which Chief Justice
Burger join4d. Id. at 704.
4. The common law courts spoke of malice prepense as early as the 13th century. Kaye,
The Early History of Murder and Manslaughter, Part H, 83 L.Q. REV. 569 (1967). This
expression referred to little more than an intentional wrongdoing. R. MORELAND, THE LAW OF
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felonious homicide into degrees, this use of the term was discarded.'
Malice was then used to signify the factor that distinguished murder from
manslaughter,' and was incorporated into the definitions of both crimes.7
Under this formulation of the law, malice refers to the state of mind of the
perpetrator. Express malice denotes an element of the crime of murder
which requires proof that the accused acted with a premeditated intent to
kill; implied malice refers to any state of mind sufficient for murder but
which lacked premediation.8 Malice, in both of these senses, refers to a
state of mind which is not engendered by a sudden "heat of passion" upon
adequate provocation thus distinguishing murder from the lesser crime of
voluntary manslaughter. 9
In order to facilitate proof of malice in murder prosecutions, the common
law courts created a policy presumption that, absent proof to the contrary,
a homicide is presumed to have occurred in the absence of "heat of
passion."' 10 This so-called "presumption of malice" has not been uniformly
applied by the states.
Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 544
(1934) [hereinafter cited as Perkins on Malice].
5. See Perkins on Malice, supra note 4, at 544. See also 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 478 (1895).
6. "[Malice aforethought] is the grand criterion which . . .distinguishes murder from
other killing." 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES. 198.
7. "Murder is killing with malice .... Manslaughter is an unlawful killing, without the
circumstances of malice .. " Pennsylvania v. Bell, 1 Am. Dec. 298, 301-02 (1793).
Traditionally in this nation, murder and manslaughter have been defined with reference to
malice. PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAw 51 (1969) [hereinafter cited as PERKINS]. See also People
v. Morrin, 31 Mich. App. 301, 187 N.W.2d 434, 440 n.17 (1971). Virginia law is in agreement.
Compare Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 825, 829, 96 S.E. 801, 802 (1918)(murder),
with Clark v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 360, 368, 18 S.E. 440, 443 (1893) (manslaughter).
8. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 528-30 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE &
ScoTT]. See also PERKINS, supra note 7, at 34-35, 47-48. Both of these treatises recommend
dispensing with malice as an element of murder.
Though murder is frequently defined as the unlawful killing of another "living human
being" with "malice aforethought," in modem times the latter phrase does not even
approximate its literal meaning. Hence it is preferable not to rely upon that misleading
expression for an understanding of murder but rather to consider the various types
of murder (typed according to the mental element) which the common law came to
recognize and which exist today in most jurisdictions:
(1) intent-to-kill murder;
(2) intent-to-do-serious-bodily-harm murder;
(3) depraved-heart murder; and
(4) felony murder.
LAFAVE & ScoTw, supra, at 528. Only subsection (1) above encompasses murder "with malice
aforethought" as contemplated by the early definitions of murder; subsections (2) through
(4) are states-of-mind involving implied malice. Id. See also Perkins on Malice, supra note
4, at 569; PERKINS, supra note 7, at 46.
9. See authorities cited in note 8 supra.
HOMICIDE 10 (1952);

10. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 694 (1975).
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Most modern jurisdictions employ the "presumption of malice" as a
mere permissible inference rather than a true presumption, despite the
retention of its traditional label." In these states, if the-prosecution has
proven an intentional homicide and the accused has offered no evidence
of "heat of passion," the jury may, but need not, conclude that malice
existed. Because the inference that no malice exists is always available to
the jury, an accused is entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as well as an instruction that he is not to be found guilty of
murder unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of "heat of passion." This is proper even if the evidence does not
warrant granting these instructions.'2 Accordingly, the "presumption"
benefits an accused under this view since he might escape a conviction of
murder even though the evidence actually supports one.' 3
In contrast, the common law courts and a minority of modem jurisdictions accord to the presumption of malice the attributes of what is usually
termed a rebuttable or mandatory presumption. Although the term "presumption" remains elusive, the concept generally refers to an evidentiary
device designed to establish who has the "burden of proof" on a particular
fact." The presumption of malice in this context places upon an accused
some type of burden regarding "heat of passion" once the prosecution has
established a homicide. The nature of defendant's burden to disprove malice is the subject of some debate.
An approach adopted by many older cases,' 5 which has recently gained
support,'" is to place the burden of producing evidence (going forward with
Scorr, supra note 8, at 539-40.
12. Compare LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 8, at 539-40 with MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at
804. See also 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENcE § 2511a, at 412 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE]; Holland & Chamberlin, Statutory CriminalPresumptions:Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt, 7 VAL. L. REV. 147, 152 (1973); Note, Reforming The Law of Homicide, 59
VA. L. REV. 1270, 1273 (1973).
13. See authorities cited in notes 11 & 12 supra. The situation varies when an inference is
used to permit the trier of fact to conclude that the prosecution has met its burden of proof
with respect to the inferred fact by having satisfactorily established other facts. A permissible
inference of this type, since it operates against the accused rather than in his favor, must
satisfy certain due process requirements. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702-03 n.31
(1975).
14. Note, IrrebuttablePresumptions:An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449, 451 n.7
(1975). See generally Stumbo, Presumptions-A View at Chaos, 3 WASHBURN L.J. 182 (1964).
Professor McCormick's treatise proposes an even broader definition:
[A] presumption is a standardized practice, under which certain facts are held to call
for uniform treatment with respect to their effect as proof of other facts. MCCORMICK,
supra note 1, at 803.
15. See cases cited mi9 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2491.
16. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 802. According to one leading authority, an accused in
11. LAFAvE &
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the evidence) of "heat of passion" on the accused. He meets this burden
merely by demonstrating that there exists sufficient probative evidence to
raise the issue of "heat of passion."17 Once the accused has done so, he is
entitled to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter and an instruction
that the prosecution must prove the absence of "heat of passion" beyond
a reasonable doubt. 1 Whether this burden has been satisfied is a question
for the trial judge; hence, a jury instruction which refers to the burden
would appear improper. 9
This treatment of the presumption aids the prosecution in proving malice, an element of murder which often resists direct proof,20 by requiring
the prosecution to disprove "heat of passion" only if the issue is properly
raised by the accused. If the presumption were not employed, the prosecution might be required to negate the existence of every conceivable circumstance which bears on whether malice existed, including "heat of
passion."'2' On its face, this treatment of the presumption does not violate
constitutional requirements. 22 The prosecution is never required to negate
Virginia must satisfy the burden of producing evidence as to matters of defense including
accident, self-defense and the heat of passion. M. MARSHALL, J. FITZHUGH & J. HELVIN, THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE IN VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA § 201, at 359-60 n.54 (C. Nash ed. 1954)
[hereinafter cited as MARSHALL, FITZHUGH & HELVIN]. In Virginia, the general rule is that a
mandatory presumption merely affixes the burden of producing evidence on the party against
whom the presumption might operate and leaves the burden of persuasion unaffected. Id. §
211, at 375.
17. PERKINS, supra note 7, at 50-51; 9 WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2491.
18. See authorities cited in note 17 supra.
19. [The] burden of producing evidence is a matter solely for the judge ....
There
is no occasion to mention the burden of producing evidence at any place in the
charge. . . . MARSHALL, FITZHUGH & HELVIN, supra note 16, § 200, at 356.
However, while this same treatise has asserted that the "presumption of malice" has the
effect of shifting the burden of producing evidence to the accused, it has not criticized the
practice in Virginia of instructing on the presumption. Id. § 201, at 359-60 n.54. Although
this inconsistency is seemingly inexplicable, it might be explained in part by the fact that
the law of presumptions was developed primarily in civil cases. Presumptions are aberrations
in criminal cases. See authorities cited in note 1 supra and note 22 infra. In contrast, a
minority of courts have taken the position that instructing on the burden of producing evidence is proper. See Stumbo, Presumptions-A View at Chaos, 3 WASHBURN L. REV. 182, 20812 (1964).
20. Cf. People v. Morrin, 31 Mich. App. 301, 187 N.W.2d 434, 441 (1971). For an article
discussing proof of malice in Virginia see 7 WM. & MARY L. REV. 399 (1966).
21. PERKINS, supra note 7, at 49-52. Other circumstances which have a bearing on malice
are self-defense and accident. Id. Of course, by initially requiring the accused to raise the
issue of "heat of passion," the prosecution is collaterally benefited since it can avoid time
consuming, unnecessary and confusing proof of the absence of the issue.
22. The approach does, however, create considerable conceptual difficulty. An accused who
fails to meet the burden of producing evidence is theoretically subject to a directed verdict.
This problem arises primarily in reference to self-defense and accidental killing. Both of these
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all potential defenses of an accused; rather, the accused must make clear
his defenses. Nevertheless, a presumption which shifts the burden of producing evidence to a criminal defendant must satisfy due process requirements?2 The traditional test for such presumptions is ". . . that where
there is a 'rational connection' between the facts proved and the facts
presumed . . . it is permissible to shift the burden of producing evidence
to the defendant." 4 This test is clearly satisfied if the presumption meets
the "reasonable doubt" standard; that is, the evidence necessary to invoke
the presumption is sufficient to convince a rational jury that the presumed
fact exists beyond a reasonable doubt.? It is submitted that when the
prosecution proves a homicide beyond a reasonable doubt, and no probative evidence of "heat of passion" is offered by either the accused or the
prosecution, a rational juror would find malice beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hence, this treatment of the presumption of malice would appear
2
constitutionally permissible. 1
defenses negate the malice necessary to sustain a murder conviction. If an accused, having
relied solely on one of these two defenses, failed to offer probative evidence of the defense's
existence, the court, in theory, could direct the jury to find the accused guilty of murder. A
directed verdict against an accused, even to a single element of a crime, would be an unwelcomed innovation into the criminal law. But since the courts have not taken, and are not
likely to take, this approach, the criticism is of more theoretical than practical significance.
Cf. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 804.
23. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 702-03 n.31 (1975).
24. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 n.11 (1973). The Court held that an inference
of guilty knowledge might arise from the unexplained possession of recently stolen property
and, therefore, that a statute giving effect to this inference was constitutionally permissible.
The "rational connection" test for presumptions was first introduced in a civil case, Mobile,
J.&K.C.R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910). The use of the test in criminal cases was later
clarified in Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943). The Court in Tot was faced with a
presumption which gave rise to the presumed fact that an accused illegally received a firearm
in interstate commerce and that such receipt was subsequent to the statute's effective date.
The presumption arose when the prosecution proved that the accused had been convicted of
a crime of violence and had possession of a firearm. The Court held that the presumption
did not meet constitutional requirements "because of the lack of connection between the two
in common experience." Id. at 468. More recent cases have further explained the test. See
cases cited in Comment, The Constitutionalityof the Common Law Presumption of Malice
In Maine, 54 B.U.L. REV. 973, 980-86 (1974). See generally Holland & Chamberlin, supra note
1, at 151-67.
25. Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 846 n.11 (1973). To date, the Supreme Court
has not required that the reasonable doubt standard be met before upholding a presumption
which shifts the burden of producing evidence to an accused. The test traditionally applied
is the "more likely than not" standard.
[A] criminal statutory presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary', and
hence unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that
the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is
made to depend. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969).
26. In Mullaney, the Court indicated that the presumption of malice in the context
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The situation differs significantly when the accused is forced to establish
affirmatively the existence of "heat of passion," that is, the burden of
persuasion is placed upon the accused. Due process demands more exacting standards when the presumption of malice is interpreted as shifting
this burden.2 Once the prosecution has proven an unlawful and intentional
homicide beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury would be instructed that it
must conclude that malice existed unless the accused affirmatively proves
by some standard of proof, such as by a preponderance, that "heat of
passion" did exist.2 1 For example, in criminal cases, the "presumption of
sanity" has often been given the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion
to an accused. To overcome this presumption in Virginia,29 and other jurisdictions, :" the accused must prove his insanity by a preponderance of the
evidence. The jury is so instructed after all the evidence has been submitted." In Leland v. Oregon,32 the Supreme Court upheld as constitutionally
permissible this application of the presumption of sanity. However, the
Court's conclusion was based on the fact that Oregon treated insanity as
an affirmative defense; ' 3 that is, although the state had proven beyond a
reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime charged, the state
would not punish an accused if he affirmatively proved that he lacked
responsibility for his actions.
An affirmative defense, such as insanity, must be distinguished from the
situation in which the burden of persuasion is placed upon an accused
discussed in note 25 supra might be constitutionally permissible. 421 U.S. 684, 702-03 nn.30
& 31 (1975). See Comment, The Constitutionalityof the Common Law Presumptionof Malice
in Maine, 54 B.U.L. REV. 973, 987 (1974), concluding that a presumption of malice shifting
to the accused not only the burden of producing evidence but also the burden of persuasion
was constitutional. Even if the reasonable doubt standard were not met, the "more-likelythan-not" standard would be.
27. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 n.31 (1975).
28. Id. at 688, 695-96 n.20; McCORMICK, supra note 1, at 802-04; cf. MARSHALL, FITZHUGH
& HELVIN, supra note 16, at 359 n.54.

29. See 10 MICHIE'S

JURISPRUDENCE,

Insane and Other Incompetent Persons § 49, at 170

(1950), and cases cited therein.
30. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 8, at 313.
31. See, e.g., Taylor v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 316, 322, 157 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1967). See
also M. DOUBLES, E. EMROCH & R. MERHIGE, VIRGINIA JURY INSTRUcTIONS § 103.02, at 552
(1964) [hereinafter cited as DOUBLES, EMROCH & MERHIGE].
32. 343 U.S. 790 (1952). The Court in Leland upheld an Oregon statute requiring an
accused to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
33. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 705-06 (1975)(Rehnquist, J., & Burger, C.J., concurring), citing with approval Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 792, 795 (1952). See also MICHIE'S
JURISPRUDENCE Homicide § 58, at 399 (1950). But see 30 LA. L. REV. 117, 128 (1969), which
concluded that a rule which forces an accused to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt
violates due process and that Leland is no longer sound.
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regarding an element of the crime itself. In any criminal prosecution, due
process commands that the burden of persuasion be placed "on the
[state] to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every material and necessary
element of the criminal offense charged. The accused has no burden to
prove anything. 3' 4 This principle, which has well-established constitutional origins, 35 was the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in Mullaney
3 6
v. Wilbur.
In Mullaney, the Court reviewed Maine's law of homicide. Unlike Virginia law, which uses the term malice to distinguish murder from manslaughter, 3 Maine law treats both crimes as a single offense known as
criminal homicide and employs malice only to determine the appropriate
punishment categories.3 The trial judge in Mullaney had instructed the
jury that if the prosecution established that the homicide was both intentional and unlawful, then malice was to be "conclusively implied" unless
the accused proved by a "fair preponderance" that he had acted in the
"heat of passion. '39 Siiice the accused under this scheme would be entitled to a lesser punishment only if he met his burden of persuasion, the
Supreme Court concluded that the instruction could not survive a due
process attack. 0 Due process required that the prosecution bear the burden
34. Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 432, 435, 201 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1974).
35. The Supreme Court has expressed the view in numerous opinions that proof of a
criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required. See, e.g., Davis v.
United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488 (1895). For a compilation of cases see In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970), wherein the Court concluded:
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. Id. at 364.
36. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
37. 9 MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE Homicide § 28, at 366-67 (1950).
38. State v. Lafferty, 309 A.2d 647, 662 (Me. 1973); State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d 139, 144-46
(Me. 1971). There is little, if any, practical difference between the Maine statutes reviewed
in Mullaney and Virginia law. The Maine statutes defining murder were substantially the
same as Virginia's common law definitions. Compare ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 2651 (murder)
and § 2551 (manslaughter) (1964) (superseded by ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, §§ 201 et seq.
(Repl. Vol. 1976)) with Stapleton v. Commonwealth, 123 Va. 825, 829, 96 S.E. 801, 803 (1918)
(murder), and Clark v. Commonwealth, 90 Va. 360, 368, 18 S.E. 440, 443 (1893) (manslaughter). The punishment categories are also comparable. Compare ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17,
§ 2651 (murder-imprisonment for life) and § 2551 (manslaughter-fine of not more than
$1,000 or imprisonment for not more than 20 years) (1964) with VA. CODE ANN. 44 18.2-31
(capital murder-death), -32 (murder in the first degree-imprisonment from twenty years
to life; second degree murder-imprisonment from five to twenty years) and -35 (voluntary
manslaughter-imprisonment from one to ten years or jail for not more than twelve months
and/or fine not more than $1,000) (Repl. Vol. 1975).
39. 421 U.S. at 686.
40. Id. at 703-04.
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of persuasion on the issue of "heat of passion" if properly raised by the
accused." This is true whether malice is treated as an element of the crime
of murder or as a vital factor in determining the appropriate punishment
category, since under either approach the accused was subject to a greater
punishment if there existed no "heat of passion."42 The Court was not
restrained by history; it invalidated a common law rule which had been
utilized by the State of Maine for over a century. 3
THE PRESUMPTION OF MALICE IN VIRGINIA

The "presumption of malice" is employed in Virginia in the form of a
jury instruction. The instruction is usually given in the following manner:
(a) Every unlawful homicide is presumed to be murder in the second
degree.
(b) In order to elevate an unlawful homicide to murder in the first degree,
the burden of proving the elements thereof is upon the Commonwealth.
(c) In order to reduce an unlawful homicide in the second degree to man44
slaughter or excusable homicide, the burden is upon the defendant.

The historical origins of this instruction (hereinafter referred to as the
malice instruction) are easily traced. In 1922, the Virginia Supreme Court
upheld a comparable instruction on the ground, among others, that it was
"hoary with age.""', Having been reviewed by the Virginia court as early
as 1845, this observation was justified." As presently formulated, the great41. Id. at 698-704. The Court pointed out that the prosecution was required only to prove
the absence of "heat of passion" when that issue was raised properly. Id. at 704. This language
suggests that the burden of producing evidence can be shifted to an accused as long as the
burden of persuasion remains on the prosecution. Further support for this conclusion can be
found elsewhere. For example, one footnote stated that nothing in Mullaney is intended to
affect the requirement in many states that shifts the burden of producing evidence to an
accused. Id. at 701, 702 n.28. Another footnote suggested that the criteria for determining
whether standards of due process have been met are different when both the burden of
persuasion and the burden of producing evidence are placed upon an accused than when only
the burden of producing evidence is shifted. Id. at 702, 703 n.31.
42. By drawing [the] distinctidn [between homicides committed with malice and without
malice], while refusing to require the prosecution to establish [malice] beyond a reasonable
doubt . . . Maine denigrates the interests found critical [to due process]. Id. at 698.
43. Id. at 695, citing State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11 (1857).
44. DOUBLES, EMROCH & MERHIGE, supra note 31, § 118.20, at 627 (emphasis added).
45. Sims v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 736, 752, 115 S.E. 382, 387 (1922).
46. Hill v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. (2 Gratt.) 595, 598 (1845). The impact of history on the
Virginia court's attitude towards the presumption is well illustrated by Sims v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 746, 115 S.E. 382 (1922):
This statement of the law . . . has been followed without criticism or objection in this
jurisdiction for nearly a century. . . .If in its practical application it has proven unfair
or injurious to persons accused of homicide, it is more than probable that the fact
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est problem with the malice instruction is the use of the ambiguous term
"burden" in paragraph (c). This term might denote at least three separate
and distinct legal concepts: (1) the burden of producing evidence; (2) the
burden of persuasion; or (3) the fact that if the accused fails to point out
that a reasonable doubt exists concerning malice he will be convicted of
murder if the other elements of the crime have been proven.
As the Burden of ProducingEvidence
Virginia, like many other jurisdictions, did not clearly distinguish between the burden of producing evidence and the burden of persuasion
when the presumption of malice was initially formulated." Presently, Virginia places the burden of producing evidence on the accused." As noted
would long ago have been discovered by the bar and the bench. It has proven satisfactory in the administration of justice and not hurtful to those accused of homicide, and
we have no disposition to depart from it. Id. at 752-53, 115 S.E. at 387.
47. This problem was discussed in Mullaney, the Court noting that some "jurisdictions
blurred the distinction between [the burden of persuasion and the burden of producing
evidence] by requiring the defendant to prove 'to the satisfaction of the jury' that he acted
in the heat of passion." 421 U.S. at 695-96 n.20. See note 60 infra. Virginia followed this course
in McWhirt v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 606, 617 [46 Am. Dec. 196, 203] (1846),
wherein the Virginia court relied upon Blackstone, 4 W. BLACKSTONE, *COMMENTARIES 198,
and leading Pennsylvania cases in arriving at this confusing statement of the law. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania v. Bell, 1 Am. Dec. 298 (1793). The problem still persists. See 9 MICHIE'S
JURISPRUDENCE

Homicide § 55, at 394 (1950).

48. In Virginia, the cases initially appeared to adopt the view that the presumption of
malice was merely a permissible inference. In Mercer v. Commonwealth, 150 Va. 588, 594,
142 S.E. 369, 371 (1928), the court concluded that the malice instruction would be disallowed
only in rare cases, such as when an accused committed homicide while laboring under a
reasonable apprehension of death. By negative implication, the decision suggests that an
accused is always entitled to the malice instruction and to an instruction on voluntary manslaughter even though there exists no evidence of mitigating circumstances. This view was
adopted by the court in Taylor v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 587, 591, 43 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1947).
In Plyn{ale v. Commonwealth, 195 Va. 582, 79 S.E.2d 610 (1954), the trial judge refused to
give the malice instruction and an instruction on second degree murder because the only
theory supported by the evidence was whether the accused was guilty of felony murder. The
court reversed, stating:
[A]ccused was entitled to have the benefit of the presumption in his favor presented
to the jury [because the presumption raised matters of fact to be determined by the
jury]. This was not done by any instruction, and the refusal to accord him the benefit
of that presumption was not warranted. Id. at 597, 79 S.E.2d at 618.
Three judges filed a vigorous dissent. The view of the dissent was adopted in Thacker v.
Commonwealth, 207 Va. 962, 967, 154 S.E.2d 130, 133 (1967), where the court upheld a refusal
to instruct on voluntary manslaughter as no evidence supported the instruction. Finally, in
Wooden v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 629, 634-35, 159 S.E.2d 623, 627 (1968), the court expressly overruled Plymale and refused to grant the malice instruction and an instruction on
second degree murder because the evidence did not warrant doing so. This result was followed
in Wright v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 352, 353, 192 S.E.2d 748, 749 (1972).
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above, most jurisdictions require that the accused produce "some probative evidence" of "heat of passion" before he is entitled in a murder prosecution to the malice instruction or to an instruction on voluntary
manslaughter. Virginia seemingly requires a lesser standard. According to
the recent decision of McClung v. Commonwealth,49 an accused is entitled
to these instructions if they are supported by "any credible evidence."
Admittedly, this may be a distinction without a difference. For many
years, it was uncertain whether the Virginia court could require even this
showing, a view which provoked considerable disagreement among members of the court.!(
On its face, the Virginia approach appears permissible. The burden of
producing evidence concerning malice may constitutionally rest upon a
criminal defendant.' However, instructing the jury concerning this burden
seems improper for at least two reasons. First, whether the burden of
producing evidence has been met is a question of law solely for the trial
judge, not a question of fact for the jury.5" Second, instructing on this
burden without distinguishing it from the burden on the prosecution to
prove the absence of "heat of passion" beyond a reasonable doubt,
naturally tends to confuse the jury as to who bears 'the ultimate burden of
persuasion as to guilt.53 Therefore, it is unlikely that the "presumption of
The argument can be advanced that the Plymale-Wooden line of cases are only applicable
when felony-murder is the basis of a homicide prosecution. No cases have directly addressed
the situation where an accused requests the malice instruction and an instruction on voluntary manslaughter when no evidence warrants granting the instructions. However, the underlying premise of Wooden-that instructions in homicide cases should be based on the evidence-would appear to control.
If there is a burden of producing evidence of "heat of passion" upon the accused in a murder
trial, it is not very demanding. In Taylor v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 587, 43 S.E.2d 906
(1947) (pre-Wooden decision), the court summarized the law on instructing on lesser
included offenses of murder as follows: "It is reversible error for the trial court to refuse to
instruct the jury on lesser offenses charged in the indictment if there is any evidence in the
record tending to prove such lesser offenses." Id. at 591, 43 S.E.2d at 908 (emphasis added).
This statement, while tempered by Wooden, remains illustrative of Virginia law. See note 49
infra.
49. 215 Va. 654, 657, 212 S.E.2d 290, 293 (1975). In McClung, the accused, charged with
the slaying of her ex-boyfriend/former employer, alleged that she killed him after he attempted to rape her. The trial judge refused to instruct on voluntary manslaughter. The
supreme court reversed, reiterating in essence what Taylor, supra note 48, had stated a
quarter of a century earlier: "If a proferred instruction finds any support in credible evidence,
its refusal is reversible error." Id. at 657, 212 S.E.2d at 293. See also Painter v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 360, 363, 171 S.E.2d 166, 171 (1969).
50. See note 48 supra.
51. See notes 24, 25, 26 & 41 and accompanying text supra.
52. See note 19 supra.
53.

McCORMICK,

supra note 1, at 783-84; cf. 7 MICHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE Evidence § 29, at

363, § 32, at 366 (1949). After reviewing such a practice, now discarded in Missouri, one
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malice" merely shifts the burden of producing evidence to an accused.
Conversely, it is very likely that the burden of producing evidence is not
the "burden" referred to in the malice instruction.
As the Burden of Persuasion
The recent decision of Perkins v. Commonwealth" summarized the law
of homicide in the following manner:
The test of murder is malice. . . .Furthermore, there is a prima facie presumption of malice arising from the mere fact of a homicide . ..and...
the burden is on the accused to reduce and on the Commonwealth to elevate,
the grade of the offense.
This formulation creates considerable difficulty. The operation of a prima
facie presumption would seem to require an accused to prove affirmatively
by some standard of proof that he acted in the heat of passion. The term
has not yet been defined in any Virginia criminal case. Nevertheless, at
least one equity case has suggested this interpretation." This analysis is
not highly persuasive considering that the words "prima facie" have given
rise to numerous interpretations."
A more troublesome feature of the malice instruction and the law of
homicide as stated in Perkins is the fact that the burden of persuasion
which is properly placed upon the Commonwealth is not distinguished
from the burden placed upon the accused. The Virginia court itself appears
commentator concluded: "[A]n instruction worded in this fashion can only confuse the jury
and might lead them to believe that in order to rebut the presumption of malice the defendant
is required to prove he did not intentionally kill the victim. Of course, this is exactly what a
presumption should not do." 38 Mo. L. REv. 105, 108 (1973). See note 64 infra.
54. 215 Va. 69, 73, 205 S.E.2d 385, 387 (1974), citing Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 174 Va.
391, 398, 401, 4 S.E.2d 752, 755, 759 (1939), and Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 132 Va. 681, 686,
111 S.E. 90, 92 (1922).
55. In Parsons v. Wysor, 180 Va. 84, 94, 21 S.E.2d 753, 757 (1942), the court addressed a
factual situation where a beneficiary conveyed land by deed to the wife of the fiduciary. The
court noted that:
Equity would raise a prima facie presumption against its validity, and it would cast
upon the party seeking to sustain the deed the burden of proving affirmatively its
compliance with equitable requisites and overcoming the presumption. Id. at 94, 21
S.E.2d at 755 (emphasis added), quoting Waddy v. Grimes, 154 Va. 615, 647, 153 S.E.
807, 817 (1930).
56. One leading authority contends, contrary to the language of Parsons,that the burden
of persuasion is not placed upon the fiduciary. MARSHALL, FITZHUGH & HELVIN, supra note 16,
§ 220, at 386. These authors further discuss the many interpretations of the phrase "prima
facie presumption." Id. § 196, at 349-50, § 211, at 374-76. Similiar confusion is created when
the court speaks of a "legal" presumption of malice. See generally id. § 201, at 359-60 n.59,
§ 228, at 403 n.6.
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to have confused these burdens at various times.5 7 For example, in Hobson
v. Yoeull, " the court stated that the two burdens were "to be applied in
analyzing and weighing the evidence." This would suggest that the burden
on the accused is one of persuasion.
The failure of the Virginia court at various times to distinguish these two
burdens may be attributed in part to the early common law instructions,
which made it incumbent upon the accused to prove to the "satisfaction
of the jury" that circumstances of mitigation existed. 9 Whatever the
reasons, some courts have suggested that such instructions at the very
least required the accused to affirmatively disprove malice by a preponderance.60 Many courts and commentators have disapproved of such
language." One such attack arose in a dissent to the leading Massachusetts
decision of Commonwealth v. York.2 This dissent, which set forth many
of the principles upon which Mulaney is based,63 has been expressly re57. See, e.g., Bryan v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 709, 714, 109 S.E. 477, 478 (1921), wherein
the court concluded, without distinguishing the two burdens, that a verdict of second degree
murder meant that the prosecution had failed to meet its burden of elevating the offense and
the accused had failed to meet his burden of reducing the offense. Some of the confusion was
alleviated in Sims v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 736, 115 S.E. 382 (1922), discussed in notes 65
& 66 and accompanying text infra.
58. 177 Va. 906, 913, 15 S.E.2d 76, 78 (1941). According to MARSHALL, FiTZHUGH & HELVIN,
supra note 16, § 228, at 403 n.6, this analysis "suggestfs] that an actual burden of persuasion
to reduce the crime is on the accused."
59. See, e.g., Bryan v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 709, 714, 109 S.E. 477, 478 (1921); cf.
McWhirt v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. (3 Gratt.) 606, 617-18 [46 Am. Dec. 196, 2031 (1846).
For a short discussion of the problems created by this language see authorities cited note 47
supra. The language in many other Virginia cases indicates that an accused has the burden
of persuasion or the duty to disprove malice. See, e.g., Little v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1020,
1023, 175 S.E. 767-68 (1934); Mundy v. Commonwealth, 144 Va. 609, 614-15, 131 S.E. 242,
244 (1926); Scott v. Commonwealth, 143 Va. 510, 523, 129 S.E. 360, 364 (1925); Hall v.
Commonwealth, 89 Va. 171, 178, 15 S.E. 517, 519 (1893).
60. For example, in State v. Freeman, 275 N.C. 662, 666, 170 S.E.2d 461, 464 (1969), the
North Carolina court reviewed the law of homicide in the state, which places upon an accused
a burden to prove "heat of passion" to "the satisfaction of the jury." See note 47 supra.The
court determined that the quantum of proof was indeed whether the jury is satisfied and this
burden could equal or exceed proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Accord, State v.
Hamilton, 23 N.C. App. 311, 208 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1974). Other states, like Maine, have placed
the standard of proof of a preponderance upon the accused. See State v. Wilbur, 278 A.2d
139, 145-46 (Me. 1971).
61. See, e.g., State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 488 P.2d 322 (1971); People v. Morrin, 31 Mich.
App. 301, 187 N.W.2d 434 (1971); Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935 A.C.
462; Note, Reforming the Law of Homicide, 59 VA. L. REV. 1270 (1973).
62. 50 Mass. (9 Met.) 93, 125 [43 Am. Dec. 373] (1845)(Wilde, J., dissenting).
63. In York, the Massachusetts court held that an accused was required to rebut the
presumption of malice by a preponderance. Justice Wilde filed a vigorous dissent contending
that the Commonwealth had the burden of persuasion "to prove all the material allegations
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jected by the Virginia court. 4
In sum, there exists a considerable amount of dicta in Virginia case law
supporting the conclusion that the presumption of malice in Virginia operates to the prejudice of the accused by requiring him to disprove the absence of malice by some unspecified standard of proof. If this view is found
to be illustrative of Virginia law, the law of Virginia is patently
unconstitutional.
The Burden as a Nonburden
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Virginia court in the leading case of
Sims v. Commonwealth'5 interpreted the term "burden" in a constitutionally permissible manner. The court, while upholding the malice instruction, concluded as follows:
[A]ll that is meant [when it is stated that the burden is upon the prisoner]
is that it is incumbent upon the prisoner to introduce evidence sufficient to
raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury as to whether the offense is
murder in the second degree. When this amount of evidence has been introduced, the prisoner has fully carried the burden which is placed upon him
by the instruction. The prisoner is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable
doubt arising from the evidence of the Commonwealth as well as from his own
evidence.

Since the burden of persuasion remains upon the prosecution concerning
malice, the mandate of Mullaney is arguably not violated. However, the
problems which arise when this burden is referred to in jury instructions
are not obviated.
Mullaney was not concerned merely with the underlying law of homicide
in the State of Maine; it was also concerned with the "operation and effect
in the indictment," including malice. Id. at 134. [Am. Dec. at 395]. The underlying rationale
of the dissent that the burden of persuasion, beyond a reasonable doubt, must always remain
on the prosecution, is the principle espoused in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), and
found to be controlling in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698-700 (1975).
64. [Wie are not unmindful of the strong argument advanced in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Wilde . . . in Commonwealth v. York . . . . [Hiowever, [we have]

held that

. . .

unless the accused shows circumstances of justification, excuse, or

alleviation, a verdict of murder in the second degree will be warranted. Mercer v.
Commonwealth, 150 Va. 588, 594, 142 S.E. 369, 370 (1928), quoted with approval,
Adams v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1053, 1061, 178 S.E. 29, 32 (1935).
In Adams, Justices Epes and Browning dissented on the ground that the jury instruction
reviewed by the court, comparable to that quoted in the text, was not sustainable on principle
and that the dissenting opinion of Justice Wilde in York embodied the correct analysis. Id.
at 1063-65, 178 S.E. at 33-34 (Epes & Browning, JJ., dissenting).
65. 134 Va. 736, 753, 115 S.E. 382, 387-88 (1922).
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of the law as applied and enforced by the state."66 This approach, like
previous due process cases decided by the Supreme Court,"7 takes into
account the reliability of jury verdicts. To instruct a jury that an accused
has a "burden," without explaining it or distinguishing it from the burden
of the prosecution, is at best confusing." Under these circumstances, an
accused may not only feel compelled to forgo his constitutional right to
remain silent in order to meet this "burden," 9 but might also be convicted
of murder simply because an uniformed jury concludes that he has not met
his "burden," even though a reasonable doubt exists concerning malice. If
the net result of the malice instruction is to increase significantly the
likelihood of an erroneous murder conviction, it is manifestly unconstitutional under the principles enunciated in Mullaney,0 and prior due process
7
cases. '
66. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 699, quoting St. Louis S.W.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235
U.S. 350, 362 (1914). Mullaney and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), are concerned with
substance rather than form. 421 U.S. at 699. In Mullaney, the Court rejected Maine's argument that Winship was inapplicable because malice only affected a punishment category and
was not an element of murder. See note 42 and accompanying text supra. Winship invalidated
the burden of persuasion of a preponderance in State juvenile proceedings even though
"delinquency" was not formally considered a crime under state law. 397 U.S. at 365-66.
Likewise, the malice instruction is impermissible if it has the effect of confusing the jury as
to the ultimate burden of persuasion on the prosecution, in spite of the fact that the underlying law is not abhorrent to constitutional requirements.
67. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. at 699 n.26, 700-01. See also Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477, 486 (1972) (upholding a statute permitting introduction into evidence of confessions
provided they were shown by a preponderance to be voluntary; the Court found no effect on
reliability); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970)(invalidating a "delinquency proceeding," which required proof by a preponderance on a charge that would have been a crime if
committed by an adult); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958) (taxpayers were
unconstitutionally subjected to a procedure requiring them to prove affirmatively their right
to a tax exemption).
68. See generally authorities cited in note 53 supra. The confusing nature of instructions
on the presumption of malice was a primary concern of the appellate court in People v.
Morrin, 31 Mich. App. 301, 187 N.W.2d 434 (1971), which found such an instruction objectionable. The court added:
[T]o instruct a jury that'malice is presumed from the fact of killing is to invite
confusion concerning the ultimate burden of [persuasion] in the trial. The prosecution must always prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; a rule of law
that shifts the burden of proof with respect to "malice" tends to cloud the dimensions
of the prosecution's ultimate burden. 187 N.W.2d at 442.
69. See note, Reforming The Law of Homicide, 59 VA. L. REV. 1270, 1274 (1973).
70. Cf. 421 U.S. at 704.
71. Any instruction which "substantially impairs the truth-finding function and so raises
serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts" would apparently violate the mandate
of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), Ivan v. City of New York, 407 U.S. 203, 204 (1972),
and necessarily Mullaney. See also State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 488 P.2d 322 (1971)(holding
an instruction on the presumption of malice unconstitutional in light of Winship); accord,

1976]

COMMENTS

While the Virginia court has permitted an instruction which eliminated
reference to a burden on the accused when the defense of accidental killing
was raised, 72 it has not permitted revision of the malice instruction in other
situations. The court has generally cited two reasons for upholding the
variations of the present malice instruction. First, the court has concluded
that if any confusion does result from referring to a "burden" on the accused, it is cured by the reasonable doubt instruction customarily given
at a murder trial. 73 Secondly, the court has stated that history has proven
Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935 A. C. 462 (English case discarding the
presumption).
72. In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 848, 51 S.E.2d 152 (1949), the court allowed an
instruction which explained that an accused had no burden of persuasion concerning accident. Rather, if the jury after hearing all of the evidence had a reasonable doubt whether the
killing was accidental, they were not to find the accused guilty of murder. Id. at 856, 51 S.E.2d
at 155. Accident, like "heat of passion," negates the element of malice necessary to a murder
conviction. Likewise, the finding that the homicide was accidental does not mean that an
accused will escape criminal liability for his actions. For example, he might be convicted of
involuntary manslaughter. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36 (Repl.Vol. 1975)(annotation cites cases
in agreement with proposition stated); cf. 9 MIcHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE, Homicide § 33 (1950).
In Lawhorne v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 608, 610 n.1, 194 S.E.2d 747, 749 n'l (1973), the
Virginia court acknowledged that earlier instructions had placed a burden on the accused to
establish an accidental killing but did not resolve the conflict as to which of the two inconsistent approaches is preferable.
73. Sims v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 736, 754, 115 S.E. 382, 388 (1922), wherein the court
explained:
Instructions ought to be read as a whole and when the [malice] instruction is read in
connection with [the reasonable doubt instruction], it is difficult to understand how
the jury could have had any doubt on the subject. . . . All [an accused] has to prove
in any case is such a state of facts as will raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the
jury as to the existence of the . . . facts sought to be established by the Commonwealth, and this was sufficiently stated in [the reasonable doubt instruction which]
• . . is an adequate statement of law for the guidance of the jury.
The problems are not necessarily dispensed with when this analysis is adopted. Even under
this approach, the jury is still not told precisely that "heat of passion," and its converse,
malice, must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Justices Epes and Browning, in their
dissent in Adams v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1053, 1063, 178 S.E. 29, 33 (1935)(Epes &
Browning, JJ., dissenting), asserted that malice instructions
[sihould be accompanied by one reading substantially as follows: 'If upon a consideration of all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the killing was done with
malice or not, you should not find him guilty of murder.' Id. at 1064, 178 S.E. at 33.
It is submitted that a reasonable doubt instruction of this type is more likely to cure any
misinterpretation of the term "burden" than the instruction traditionally employed. On
numerous occasions, the Supreme Court has approved the doctrine that instructions are not
to be judged in artificial isolation but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.
See, e. g., Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104,
107 (1926). This doctrine could probably be invoked to uphold the malice instruction when
it is accompanied by the instruction suggested by Justice Epes. On the other hand, the typical
reasonable doubt instruction is probably insufficient to alleviate the confusion created by the
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that the instruction has not been unjust in its practical application."'
THE POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS OF Mullaney
The meaning of the term "burden" as used in the malice instruction
remains unresolved, if not unresolveable. Yet, the Virginia court will probably conclude that Sims is illustrative of Virginia law, a conclusion to
which the federal courts might defer. If this approach is adopted, the
question as to the constitutionality of the "presumption of malice," as
utilized in Virginia, resolves itself primarily into one of fact-whether,
after all of the instructions are given in a murder prosecution, the jury fully
understands that the only true burden is on the prosecution to prove every
essential element of murder, including the absence of "heat of passion"
beyond a reasonable doubt.
The finding that the instruction is unconstitutional in its effect is not
one which will be lightly reached, because it would probably require the
Commonwealth of Virginia to retry many, if not all, convicted murderers
at whose trial the malice instruction was given. Of primary concern is the
question of retroactivity. The Supreme Court has generally held that decisions are to be applied retroactively when the constitutional infirmity involves the reliability of jury verdicts.75 This situation is present in
dual use of the term "burden" in the malice instruction. Cf. State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110,
488 P.2d 322 (1971) (holding that an impermissible instruction on the presumption of malice
is not cured by a reasonable doubt instruction).
74. Sims v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 736, 753, 115 S.E. 382, 387 (1922). The relevant
language of the court in Sims is quoted at length in note 46 supra.The reasoning employed
by the court is of questionable validity. Unlike the situation present in 1922, the large majority of states today have abandoned the "presumption of malice" as it was formulated and
used at common law. LAFAvE & ScOrr, supra note 8, at 539-40. Of primary importance,
however, is the fact that the Court in Mullaney was not restrained by tradition or history in
reaching its conclusion. See note 43 and accompanying text supra. Nevertheless, the Virginia
court, which has been persistent in upholding the instruction on the basis of tradition (see,
e.g., Barber v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 241, 253, 142 S.E.2d 484, 493 (1965)), has never shown
any inclination to discard it.
75. Mullaney is probably fully retroactive. First, it does not advance new constitutional
doctrine but rather applies principles enunciated in prior due process cases, especially In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970). In Winship, the Court invalidated a "delinquency proceeding," which required proof by a preponderance on a charge that would have been a crime if
committed by an adult. The Court reasoned that a juvenile could be convicted only by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to the crime with which he is charged
without a violation of due process. Id. at 364.
The precise question presented in Mullaney was whether the principles of Winship were
applicable when, instead of different elements of a crime, there were different degrees,
requiring different punishments. In contrast, Virginia law is directly controlled by Winship
without further clarification. In Virginia, malice is a required element of the separate and
distinct offense of second-degree murder rather than an element that merely distinguishes
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degree. The pre-Mullaney decision of State v. Cuevas, 53 Haw. 110, 488 P.2d 322 (1971),
agrees with this analysis. In Cuevas, the Supreme Court of Hawaii invalidated an instruction
comparable to Virginia's and employed in the same manner, relying solely on Winship.
Since Winship has been given complete retroactive effect, Ivan v. City of New York, 407
U.S. 203 (1972), likewise so should Mullaney. Cf. Burko v. State, 19 Md. App. 645, 313 A.2d
864 (1974), vacated and remanded,95 S. Ct. 2624 (1975), wherein the Court remanded a case
involving the presumption of malice for further consideration in light of Mullaney even
though the facts giving rise to the alleged error arose prior to the Mullaney decision.
Furthermore, even if Mullaney is interpreted as advancing new constitutional doctrine not
contained in Winship, or, if the Court holds that the Ivan decision, which held Winship to
be fully retroactive, was arrived at only in reference to the particular facts in Winship, the
same reasons for retroactive application of Winship apply to Mullaney. The Court appears
justified in making an independent evaluation of retroactivity in spite of Ivan. The leading
retroactivity decision of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), bolsters this analysis:
Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from
applying, a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh the merits and demerits in
each case. Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
Nonetheless, the concerns manifested in Ivan dominate Mullaney. In Ivan, the Court stated
that a new constitutional rule was to be given complete retroactive effect where its major
purpose "is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial which substantially impairs its truthfinding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past
trials." 407 U.S. at 204, citing Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971). Accord,
Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49, 51-52 (4th Cir. 1972). Similiarly, Mullaney involves principles which are instrumental in reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error: "These
interests are implicated to a greater degree in [Mullaney] than they were in Winship itself."
421 U.S. at 700.
However, an argument can be advanced that Winship and Mullaney are distinguishable
when one considers the factors weighed by the Court when it considers retroactivity: (1) the
purpose served by the new standards; (2) the extent of reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards. These factors, promulgated in Linkletter v. Walker, supra,
and utilized by the Burger Court on numerous occasions (see, e.g., Williams v. United
States, supra)favor prospective application to a greater degree in Mullaney than was true of
Winship. Regarding factor (1), there seems to be no appreciable difference in purpose; both
cases upheld the reasonable doubt standard. But the last two factors render the cases
distinguishable. In Winship, the Court was faced with a juvenile offender who had been
adjudicated delinquent in a family court by a relatively modem procedure of limited use
which, if invalidated, would have limited effect on the over-all criminal justice system.
Mullaney, if retroactively applied, would command overturning murder convictions in states
which have relied upon a rule of law inherited from the English common law and used in most
murder trials in these states. A similar approach has been adopted in three recent state court
cases concluding that Mullaney is not retroactive. Fuentes v. State, 349 A.2d 1 (Del. 1975);
People v. Belogur, 82 Misc. 2d 907, 372 N.Y.S.2d 384 (S. Ct. 1975); State v. Hankerson, 220
S.E.2d 515 (N.C. 1975). Hankerson was cited with approval in State v. Jensen, 221 S.E.2d
717, 720 (N.C. 1976).
The above argument appears inherently tenuous after closer examination. Linkletter itself recognized that retroactivity is decided on a wholly different set of criteria where the
constitutional error stems from "the very integrity of the fact-finding process." 381 U.S. at
639. The argument proffered above is not unsound but merely inappropriate. The Court in
Ivan stressed this point:
Neither good faith reliance by state or federal authorities on prior constitutional law
or accepted practice, nor severe impact on the administration of justice has sufficed
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Mullaney, since the truth-finding function of the jury is substantially impaired when the jury is confused as to who must bear the ultimate burden
of persuasion concerning malice. Furthermore, it is possible, though unlikely, that the Burger Court may conclude that the error caused by giving
an impermissible instruction is harmful per se7 1 or the type of error which
does not require a timely objection at trial to preserve it for direct or
collateral relief in the federal courts.
It is submitted that the Virginia court will not be inclined to invalidate
a concept of such historical significance as the "presumption of malice,"
as formulated and applied in Virginia." The federal courts, however, are
to require prospective application [when the truth-finding function of the jury is
impaired]. 407 U.S. at 204.
76. "[T]here are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can
never be treated as harmless error." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). To date,
the Court has seldom found instances where the error is necessarily harmful. See, e.g., Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963)(the sixth amendment right to counsel); Haynes
v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515-18 (1963)(the fifth amendment privilege against coerced
confessions). See generally cases cited in Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error,59 VA. L.
REV. 988, 1002 n.42 (1973)(an analysis of the impact of In re Winship on the harmless error
doctrine). Mullaney expressed no view whether the error could be deemed harmless. 421 U.S.
at 705 (Rehnquist, J., & Burger, C.J., concurring). The preferable view is that the error could
be found harmless when the issue of "heat of passion" was not raised in the evidence of the
accused or the prosecution.
However, an argument can be fashioned that the malice instruction fosters a situation
where the error is harmful per se. The constitutional error in Mullaney infringes upon the
basic right of an accused to be presumed innocent until the state proves his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt as to every essential element of the crime charged. This right is so fundamental to our system of justice that its violation alone casts doubt upon the reliability of the
conviction. No error is more prejudicial than one which unfavorably shifts the burden of
persuasion to an accused. On the basis of these considerations, the Supreme Court of Hawaii
held in State v. Cuevss, 53 Haw. 110, 488 P.2d 322, 325 (1971), that an instruction on the
presumption of malice created error that could never be deemed harmless. The instruction
before the court in Cuevas is similar to ones used in Virginia. Compare Cuevas, 488 P.2d at
325, with Adams v. Commonwealth, 163 Va. 1053, 1055, 178 S.E. 29, 29 (1935) and Mosby v.
Commonwealth, 168 Va. 688, 693, 190 S.E. 151, 154 (1937). For an excellent analysis of the
harmless error doctrine see R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLEss ERROR (1970).
77. The Virginia court has generally not considered an allegation of constitutional error if
it could have been objected to and cured during the course of a criminal trial. See, e.g., Ford
v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 308, 315, 208 S.E.2d 921, 926 (1974)(accused could not raise
question of lack of evidence for instruction for first time on appeal); Poole v. Commonwealth,
211 Va. 258, 260, 176 S.E.2d 821, 823 (1970)(identification testimony); Woodson v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 285, 288, 176 S.E.2d 818, 821 (1970)(admissibility of confession);
Manley v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 146, 149, 176 S.E. 2d 309, 312 (1970) (evidence obtained
by search and seizure).
The court, however, is empowered to notice on appeal such allegations if good cause is
shown or otherwise to enable the court to attain the ends of justice. Va. S. Ct. R. 5:7. These
exceptions have been invoked only in rare circumstances. See, e.g., McKeon v.
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unlikely to respect Virginia legal history as much as the Virginia court.
Whatever the final result, instructing juries as to a "burden" on an accused
in a criminal prosecution is likely to be relegated to the past.
R.S.P.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 24, 26, 175 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1970)(sufficiency of evidence in indecent
exposure case); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 883, 889-90, 140 S.E.2d 688, 693
(1965) (confession unlawfully obtained from an accused who had been indicted and was represented by counsel). Since no general doctrine has been developed by the court concerning
these rules, it is unlikely that the court would notice an allegation that the malice instruction
was unconstitutional, and objectionable, for the first time on appeal. This is especially true
considering the vast effect the decision would have on the criminal justice system.
State habeas corpus would also appear unavailable. The general rule is that a constitutional right of a prisoner may not be raised by state habeas corpus
when a prisoner has been afforded a fair and full opportunity to raise and have adjudicated the question of the admissibility of evidence in his trial and upon appeal. Slayton
v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 29, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108
(1975) (citing considerable Virginia authority).
This rationale arguably encompasses the situation addressed here.
Despite the predicted resistence of the Virginia court to entertain such claims, a Mullaneytype situation is likely to be heard even though no objection was made at the trial court. The
federal courts do not favor a restrictive interpretation of the scope of habeas corpus. The
leading case of Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), foreclosed federal habeas corpus relief only
if a State prisoner's failure to prosecute his claim in the state courts can be deemed a
"deliberate by-passing of state procedures." Id. at 439. This standard would not appear to
be invoked by a Mullaney-type accused. Counsel's failure to object to an instruction which
has been customarily employed in Virginia should not be used as a basis for denying an
accused his right to due process.
Nevertheless, a colorable argument can be advanced that Pay v. Noia is inapplicable to a
Mullaney situation. In Fay, the Court was dealing with the failure of an accused to appeal.
In Mullaney, the accused failed to object. The view that the two situations are distinguishable
and require different results was adopted by Justice Rehnquist in his concurring opinion in
Mullaney. 421 U.S. at 704 & n. 32 (Rehnquist, J., & Burger, C.J., concurring). This approach
is consistent with that taken by a substantial minority of the Court who favor restricting the
scope of federal habeas corpus relief available to state prisoners. See, e.g., Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 250 (Blackmun, J., concurring), 250, 262-63, 274-75 (Powell,
J., joined by Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., concurring) (1973). See generally Miller & Shepherd, New Looks at an Ancient Writ: Habeas Corpus Reexamined, 9 U. RIcH. L. REv. 49, 7076 (1974); Tushnet, Judicial Revision of the Habeas Corpus Statutes: A Note on Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 484, 484-87, 491-92.

